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Abstract. The main objective of the paper is to provide a conceptual apparatus
of a general logical theory of language communication. The aim of the paper is
to outline a formal-logical theory of language in which the concepts of the phe-
nomenon of language communication and language communication in general
are deﬁned and some conditions for their adequacy are formulated. The theory
explicates the key notions of contemporary syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.
The theory is formalized on two levels: token-level and type-level. As such, it
takes into account the dual – token and type – ontological character of linguis-
tic entities. The basic notions of the theory: language communication, meaning
and interpretation are introduced on the second, type-level of formalization, and
their required prior formalization of some of the notions introduced on the ﬁrst,
token-level; among others, the notion of an act of communication. Owing to the
theory, it is possible to address the problems of adequacy of both empirical acts
of communication and of language communication in general. All the conditions
of adequacy of communication discussed in the presented paper, are valid for
one-way communication (sender-recipient); nevertheless, they can also apply to
the reverse direction of language communication (recipient-sender). Therefore,
they concern the problem of two-way understanding in language communica-
tion.
Keywords: act communication, language communication in general, token-type
distinction, meaning, interpretation, problem of adequacy of communication,
formal-logical theory of language communication.
1. Introduction
The key issue of modern pragmatics as a part of semiotics is communi-
cation, whose main task is the transmission, processing, and transformation
of information. It does not mean, however, that we fully understand what
communication is and what the conditions of its proper ﬂow are. The prob-
lem of communication is as old as mankind and has been present in many
diﬀerent ﬁelds ever since, for example: in cultural systems, sign systems (in-
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cluding language systems), but also in market systems, bank systems, and
recently emerged computer networks.
The discovery and cognition of reality is best realized through the pro-
cesses of cognition, whose result is knowledge of a conceptual space. It is
expressed and represented in language and transferred to others in acts
of communication by means of concrete, material language expressions –
token-expressions (see Diagram 1).
Diagram 1
Acts and processes of communication take place not only among people,
but also among any communication channels, organization units, which are
the subjects of this communication, for example: groups of people, ﬁrms,
political parties, governments and so on. In communication acts, a very im-
portant role is played by the knowledge of objects represented by means
of words and other signs. It can also be inﬂuenced by cultural, psychologi-
cal, sociological, political, and technical factors. In this paper I concentrate
on the representation of knowledge that takes place in language systems
of communication.
The aim of the paper is to outline a logical theory of language in which
the phenomenon of language communication and language communication
in general are deﬁned and some conditions for their adequacy are formu-
lated.
Assimilation and transfer of knowledge about objects to other peo-
ple is possible owing to the cognitive-communicative function of language.
The transfer of verbal knowledge takes place in acts of communication by
means of concrete, material language expressions (token-expressions). In for-
mal considerations, ﬁrst, we want to provide deﬁnitions of an act of language
communication and the related notions such as: using linguistic tokens and
interpreting linguistic tokens in order to formulate some general conditions
for the correct course of the act of communication, i.e. to consider its ade-
quacy and indicate some general causes of verbal miscommunication.
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The notion of an act of communication has to be diﬀerentiated from
the notion of language communication which is a basic concept of logical
pragmatics and of the logic of language in general.
Answering the following questions:
what is language communication as such?
and
what are the conditions for correct communication?
i.e. considering the problem of its adequacy is a primary task for a general
theory of language communication.
A logical conceptualization of the knowledge on the notion of language
communication and such related notions as meaning and interpretation of
language expressions involved in communication cannot be performed un-
less certain philosophical assumptions concerning the nature of these notions
and of the expressions themselves are adopted, and unless some prior as-
sumptions are made on the selection of primitive notions and the method
of deﬁning.
In the paper, an axiomatic theory of language communication TLC, as
a semantic-pragmatic theory, independent of extra-logical factors, is out-
lined. First, in Section 2, some aspects that we take into account in formal-
ization of the theory TLC will be discussed. The theory has to be based
on a theory of syntax T. Some foundations of the syntax theory T will
be presented in Section 3. According to the token-type distinction of lan-
guage objects originated from Ch. S. Peirce (1931–1935) it is formalized
on two levels: token and type. The proposed theory TLC will be devel-
oped in Section 4 as an expansion of the syntax theory T to the semantic-
pragmatic theory in which – on the token-level – the concept of act of lan-
guage communication by means of token-expressions (understood as phys-
ical, material, empirical, enduring through time-and-space objects) will be
deﬁned, and the problem of adequacy of communicating by means of such
expressions will be considered, while – on the type-level – the notion of
language communication by means of type-expressions (understood as ab-
stract, ideal objects, classes of token-expressions) and such related notions
as meaning and interpretation will be deﬁned and some conditions of ad-
equacy for such communication will be formulated. The paper ends with
Section 5, in which we diﬀerentiate the earlier given conditions for ade-
quacy and general, logical factors for verbal miscommunication and misun-
derstanding from the extra-logical (e.g., psychological, sociological, politi-
cal) ones.
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2. Three Aspects in Formalization of the TLC Theory
The presentations of an axiomatic formal-logical theory TLC as a se-
mantic-pragmatic theory, independent of any extra-logical factors, psycho-
logical or sociological or communication channels, which – on the one hand
– can enhance understanding, but – on the other – can interfere with it, will
be however based on some assumptions.
Although TLC will concern communication by means of expressions
of any language, it will take into consideration, to a certain degree, the
following three aspects:
(1) the cognitive-communicative function of natural language, according to
its genesis,
(2) the so-called functional approach to logical analysis of this language,
and the one connected with it:
(3) two understandings of a manner of use and a manner of interpreting
language expressions in communication.
Let us expand on these aspects.
2.1. The cognitive-communicative function of natural language
according to its genesis
Given the genesis of natural language, one can easily observe that it was
formed in the process of cognition and communication between people who
made use of material, concrete signs. Accordingly, we make the assumption
that the primitive linguistic entities applied in communication acts between
their senders and recipients are material creations, e.g. given sounds, written
signs, physical objects somehow placed in time and space, concrete objects
which have some referents attributed to them, and which are called tokens.
According to the well-known token-type distinction made by CH.S. Peirce
Diagram 2
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(1931–1935), we diﬀerentiate token-signs (signs-examples) from type-signs,
which are abstract, ideal linguistic objects, and whose physical representa-
tions are just tokens.
In acts of communication (see Diagram 2) the sender s calls, uses a to-
ken e of a sign with reference to a broadly conceived object o, while the
recipient r interprets it in compliance or in discordance with the sender’s
intention, as object o or another object o’. Compliance produces under-
standing, while discordance produces misunderstanding.
2.2. The functional approach to natural language analysis
As we have already seen, in order to explain the notion of commu-
nicating we had to introduce the terms using and interpreting, which en-
tailed the use of concrete entities, i.e. tokens, and the inclusion of situ-
ational contexts accompanying them. This shows how tokens function in
communication acts. Even though we are not going to refer to situational
contexts in our theoretical considerations, the context is always present in
such acts.
In the proposed theory TLC, the basic semantic-pragmatic notions,
including the notion of language communication and the related concepts –
meaning and interpretation – are deﬁned by means of expression-types, and
yet their deﬁnitions involve such primitive notions of the theory as using
and interpreting expression-tokens.
The formal conception of language communication has some connec-
tions with the understanding of meaning as a manner of use of expressions
and interpretation as a manner of interpreting expressions.
Speaking about the functional approach to natural language analysis,
we have to take into consideration the manner of use and the manner of in-
terpreting language expressions. The latter will be regarded as a special case
of the former.
2.3. Two understandings of manner of use and manner of
interpreting language expressions in communication
The functional approach to natural language analysis involves speaking
about two meanings of the terms: ‘a manner of use’ and ‘a manner of
interpreting’.
After the approach of J. Pelc (1971; 1979), we distinguish two under-
standings of these terms:
• in the ﬁrst of them, the manner of using (use) and the manner of
interpreting (int) occur only in given circumstances, in speciﬁc language-
situational-contexts, and concern expression-tokens only,
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• in the second – the manner of Use (usage) and the manner of inter-
preting (Int) characterize the meaning of the expression and the in-
terpretation of the expression, respectively; these manners are some-
how built into this meaning and this interpretation, respectively.
In this case an expression can be treated as isolated, static, out of
context, e.g. as an entry in a dictionary. It is then an expression-type,
a class of its concrete occurrences, a distributive set of expression-
tokens used either to represent a given object, or in concrete acts of
communication in speciﬁc linguistic-situational contexts, with refer-
ence to only one broadly conceived object or to a set of objects of
the same kind.
For example, two single tokens of the expression-type ‘scientist’, having
an established meaning (the manner of Use) or a speciﬁc interpretation
(the manner of Int) in English, can be used in a similar linguistic-situational
context either with reference to a given scientist, e.g. the one which I am
pointing to, or with reference to two diﬀerent scientists, e.g. in a situation of
teaching a student the meaning of the word ‘scientist’ through a deﬁnition
and pointing to two diﬀerent scientists.
The relation use and its sub-relation int, concerning all the relations
of physical object-based reference of expression-tokens made by users of
language, will be primitive notions of the theory TLC proposed here. The
relation Use (resp. the relation Int) is, on the other hand, a relation deﬁned
by means of the relation of use (resp. the relation int) and applied by users
of language for expression-types. The diﬀerence between these relations is
explained by the fact that two persons can Use the same expression-type by
means of its two diﬀerent tokens.
The notion of an expression is a syntactic one and must be deﬁned on
the basis of a theory of syntax.
3. Language Syntax; Theory T
3.1. Two levels of formalization of syntax of language
The theory of syntax T is formalized on two levels: token-level and type-
level. According to the token-type distinction by Peirce (1931–1935), any
language L is characterized as a construct of a double ontological nature:
both as
• a language of expression-tokens (at the token-level)
and as
• a language of expression-types (at the type-level).
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The theory T is ﬁrst formalized on the token-level as the theory of
token-syntax describing L as a language of expression-tokens, and then,
on the type-level, as the theory of type-syntax describing L as a language
of expression-types. The theory of type-syntax is an extension of the theory
of token-syntax.
Tokens are primitive objects of the theory T. They are intuitively un-
derstood as concrete, material, empirical objects, enduring through time
and space and perceived by sight. They are usually inscriptions, but do not
have to be inscriptions. They can be on paper, a notice board, a blackboard,
a computer screen, a stone, etc.; they may be conﬁgurations of such things
as jigsaw-puzzle pieces, leaves, stones, stars, or smoke signals, or illuminated
advertisements, and so on.
Types are derived objects of the theory T deﬁned by means of tokens.
They are understood as sets (classes) of tokens bearing an identiﬁability
relation to each other, i.e. types are ideal, abstract entities.
3.2. Identiﬁability of linguistic tokens
The relation of identiﬁability ∼ of tokens (a primitive notion of the the-
ory T) is determined by pragmatic factors and not by physical similarity,
and it is understood very broadly. For instance, inscriptions printed in dif-
ferent types but consisting successively of the same letters of the alphabet
may be identiﬁable, e.g. the word-tokens:
DUBROVNIK Dubrovnik
Dubrovnik
written in capital letters, in bold with bigger typeface or in italics, respec-
tively, can be regarded as identiﬁable words.
We will assume that the relation of the identiﬁability ∼ of tokens is an
equivalence relation.
The expressions of language L are deﬁned separately on the token-level
and on the type-level. They are suitable concatenations of tokens or types.
The relation of concatenation of tokens is another primitive notion of the
theory T.
3.3. Concatenations
Concatenations of tokens are complex words of language L obtained
from two words of the vocabulary of language L – the next primitive notion of
theory T. Concatenations on the token-level may be, but do not have to be,
sequences of two tokens. Intuitively, a concatenation of two written tokens a
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and b, for example in a European language, is a written token c that is
made up by adding the written token b∗, identiﬁable with b, to the token a∗,
identiﬁable with a, on the right.
For example, the concatenations of the following word-tokens:
C
o
n FORMAL METHODS
f
e
r
e n c
e
the second and the ﬁrst, is the name-token:
Formal Methods Conference
and any name-token identiﬁable with it, in particular the token aligned
vertically:
FORMAL METHODS
CONFERENCE
or any token written on each poster on the conference.
So, the relation of concatenation deﬁned by tokens is not a set-
theoretical function and the relation of identiﬁability is not a relation of
physical similarity. These two relations and the vocabulary of tokens are
primitive notions of the theory of words which is included in the theory of
syntax T. They are formalized on the token-level. All of them satisfy some
speciﬁc axioms of the theory.
3.3. Well-formed expressions
The most important notion of the theory of syntax T is the notion
of a well-formed expression of language L (for short: wfe). The theory T
can be built as a theory of language syntax in which (see Wybraniec-
Skardowska, 1991) all wfes are generated by a categorial grammar (see
K. Ajdukiewicz, 1935; Y. Bar-Hillel, 1950, 1953, 1964; J. Lambek, 1958,
1961; R. Montague, 1970a, b, c, 1974; M. J. Cresswell, 1973, 1977; W. Mar-
ciszewski, 1988; W. Buszkowski, 1988, 1989 and others). On the basis of the
theory T we can reconstruct such a grammar. The notion of a wfe is deﬁned
ﬁrstly on the token-level and then on the type-level. Then the set S of all
wfe-tokens is formally deﬁned as the smallest set including the vocabulary
of tokens and closed with respect to syntactic connection rules.
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The set S of all well-formed expression-types (for short: wfe-types) is
deﬁned as the quotient family of the set S of all wfe-tokens determined by
the relation ∼ of identiﬁability:
S = S/ ∼ .
Hence, we get that:
p ∈ S iﬀ ∃p ∈ S(p = [p]∼ = {q ∈ S : q ∼ p}).
So, any well-formed expression-type p is an equivalence set of all wfe-tokens
identiﬁable with a wfe-token p.
In the following sections, we will use wfe-types not only as elements of
the set S but also all non-empty subtypes of wfe-types of this set. By wfe-
types of L we will mean all elements of the set S∗:
S∗ = {e ⊆ p : e 6= ∅ ∧ p ∈ S},
i.e. all non-empty sets of identiﬁable wfe-tokens.
4. A Theory of Language Communication – Theory TLC
4.1. Token-level
Because the formal theory TLC should deﬁne the notion of language
communication, its conceptual apparatus has to refer to the notions ofmean-
ing and interpretation of language expressions and to empirical acts of com-
munication among people. So, on the token-level its conceptual apparatus
has to include the notions of using and interpreting token-expressions by
users of language L. Thus, we accept the postulate that in communication
acts the sender, in order to send the message, applies the function use con-
nected with the object reference of a wfe-token, whereas the recipient, in
order to receive the message, applies another function – the function int
of interpreting tokens.
4.1.1. Primitive notions of TLC
Primitive notions of the theory TLC are:
– the set User of all users of a given language L,
– the set Ont of all extra-linguistic objects described by L,
– the two-place operation use of using the wfe-tokens of L.
– the two-place operation int of interpreting the wfe-tokens of L.
The ﬁrst two primitive notions are understood very broadly. The set
User of users of language L can be composed of current as well as former
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or future users of this language. We do not make any assumptions, either,
about the ontological nature of objects of the set Ont. They can be not
only material objects, but also, for instance, ﬁctional or abstract creations
described by language L.
Of course, the sets User and Ont are non-empty sets:
AXIOM (sets: User, Ont): User 6= ∅ and Ont 6= ∅.
We understand the operation (relation) use as an operation producing,
calling, using, exposing or interpreting wfe-tokens in order to refer them
to corresponding objects of the set Ont. We can also call this operation
a function of object reference of wfe-tokens by users of language L.
The operation int occurs when we speak about communication by means
of expression-tokens. This operation will be a restriction of the former one.
The operations use and int satisfy the following axioms:
AXIOMS (using): use is a partial function of
User× S → Ont,
Dom1(use) = User and Dom2(use) ⊂ S.
AXIOM (interpreting): int is a partial function of the function use, i.e.
∅ 6= int ⊆ use and Dom2(int) ⊆ Dom2(use) ⊂ S.
The expression: use(u, e) = o, where u ∈ User, e ∈ S, o ∈ Ont is read:
the user u uses (makes or exposes) the wfe-token e to refer to the object o.
This object o is called the referent of the wfe-token e assigned by its user u.
Similarly, the expression int(u, e) = o is read: the user u interprets (under-
stands) the wfe-token e as a sign-token of the object o. The object o is called
the interpretandum of the wfe-token e.
It follows from the second axiom that every user of L uses at least one
wfe-token of L to refer to an object. Not every wfe-tokenmust have a referent.
From the third axiom it follows that the operation int of interpreting tokens
is narrower than the operation use of using tokens. This is because the
pair 〈a user, a token〉, which has a referent, may have no corresponding
interpretandum when, for instance, this token cannot be received or was used
with the intention of being interpreted by a recipient, but he/she cannot
interpret it. The fact is, however, that each pair that has an interpretandum
also has the same referent.
The notion int of interpreting tokens emerges when we speak about
communication by means of expression-tokens. From the axioms, we imme-
diately get:
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COROLLARY 1 a. ∀u ∈ Dom1(int) ∀e ∈ Dom2(int) (int(u, e) = use(u, e)),
b. ∃u ∈ User ∃e ∈ S ∃o ∈ Ont (use(u, e) = o = int(u, e)),
c. Dom1(int) ⊆ Dom1(use) ⊆ User.
Thus (see part c.), interpreting tokens is a particular case of using to-
kens.
On the basis of part a. we can state that if we limited both domains
of the operation use using wfe-tokens to the domain of operation int inter-
preting wfe-tokens of L, then these two operations would not be discernible;
then every user using any expression-token to refer to an object is a person
who also interprets this expression as this object. Such a situation is not
speciﬁc of communicating by means of tokens, but it follows from part b.
that there exists at least one user of L who uses and interprets a token in
a given act of communication by means of this token as the same object.
4.1.2. Act of Communication
The notion of communication act is new in TLC. An act of communi-
cation is deﬁned as a triple satisfying of some conditions:
DEFINITION 1a) (act of communication):
〈s, e, r〉 ∈ acom iﬀ
s, r ∈ User ∧ e ∈ S ∧ ∃o, o′ ∈ Ont (use(s, e) = o ∧ int(r, e) = o′).
Its ﬁrst element s (the sender) and the third of its elements r (the recipient)
are users of language L, the second element e is a wfe-token of L and there
exist objects o, o′ ∈ Ont such that the sender s of the expression e uses the
expression e to refer to the object o (the referent) and the recipient r of
the expression e interprets this expression as a sign-token of the object o′
(the interpretandum) (see Diagram 3a).
Communication acts can be carried out by means of two diﬀerent
expression-tokens of the same wfe-type (see Diagram 3b), if the sender uses
a token and the recipient interprets another token the same expression-type;
this is so in e-mail, microphone or telephone communication.
So, the more general deﬁnition of an act of communication is in accor-
dance with:
DEFINITION 1b) (act of communication):
〈s, e, r〉 ∈ ACom iﬀ s, r ∈ User ∧
∧ ∃e ∈ S∗ (e ∈ e ∧ ∃e′ ∈ e ∃o, o′ ∈ Ont (use(s, e) = o ∧ int(r, e′) = o′).
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Diagram 3a Diagram 3b
It is easy to see that any act of communication by means of one token is
also an act of communication by means of two expression-tokens. So, we have
COROLLARY 2. 〈s, e, r〉 ∈ acom⇒ 〈s, e, r〉 ∈ ACom.
Examples of communication acts include: making an announcement,
this present paper, a speciﬁc question, e.g. in a discussion, etc.
4.1.3. Adequacy of Communication Acts
The problem of adequacy of an act of communication by means of a wfe-
token consists in its eﬀectiveness. A communication act is eﬀective if using
the token by its sender and interpreting the token or a token identiﬁable
with that token by its recipient are in agreement, i.e. the referent to which
the sender uses the token and the interpretandum as an object of interpret-
ing the token or a token identiﬁable with that token by its recipient, are the
same. In other words, a communication act is eﬀective when an understand-
ing takes place between its sender and its recipient.
Two deﬁnitions of an act of communication by means of wfe-tokens will
bring us to two deﬁnitions of the notion of understanding (see Diagrams 4a
and 4b).
DEFINITION 2a) (understanding):
unde(s, r) iﬀ s, r ∈ User ∧ e ∈ S ∃o ∈ Ont (use(s, e) = o = int(r, e)).
DEFINITION 2b) (understanding):
Unde(s, r) iﬀ
s, r ∈ User ∧ ∃e ∈ S∗ (e ∈ e ∧ ∃e′ ∈ e ∃o ∈ Ont (use(s, e) = o = int(r, e′)).
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Diagram 4a Diagram 4b
Abbreviations ‘unde(s, r)’ and ‘Unde(s, r)’ are used here for the expres-
sions: ‘Between s and r in an act of communication by means of the wfe-
token e or the tokens: e and some identiﬁable token e′, respectively, there
exists understanding’. The object which is both the referent and the inter-
pretandum in the act of communication determined by Unde(s, r), is called
the object of understanding.
It is quite obvious that if there exists understanding in the ﬁrst sense,
then there exists understanding in the second sense, and the following con-
clusions are valid:
COROLLARY 3 a) unde(s, r)⇒ Unde(s, r),
b) unde(s, r)⇒ 〈s, e, r〉 ∈ acom,
c) Unde(s, r)⇒ 〈s, e, r〉 ∈ ACom,
d) ∃u ∈ User ∃e ∈ S (〈u, e, u〉 ∈ acom ∧ unde(u, u)),
e) acom 6= ∅ ∧ACom 6= ∅.
Point d) of the above corollary states that there exists at least one user
of the language L who takes part in an act of communication by means of an
expression-token simultaneously as the sender and the recipient, and under-
standing takes place in the act. So, we have e): the sets of all communication
acts, in both senses, are nonempty.
4.1.4. Miscommunication: Misunderstanding
If, in an act of communication by means of a wfe-token, understanding
does not take place between its sender and its recipient, then the act of
communication is not adequate and we may speak about miscommunication.
It occurs if misunderstanding takes place in this act or if an attempted act
of communication fails because of non-understanding between the sender
and the recipient.
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From two deﬁnitions of a communication act, we will obtain two deﬁ-
nitions of misunderstanding and two deﬁnitions of non-understanding.
DEFINITION 3a) (misunderstanding):
misunde(s, r) iﬀ
s, r ∈ User ∧ e ∈ S ∃o, o′ ∈ Ont (use(s, e) = o 6= o′ = int(r, e)).
DEFINITION 3b) (misunderstanding):
Misunde(s, r) iﬀ s, r ∈ User ∧
∧ ∃e ∈ S∗ (e ∈ e ∃e′ ∈ e ∃o, o′ ∈ Ont (use(s, e) = o 6= o′ = int(r, e′)).
Diagram 5a Diagram 5b
If the sender of the expression-token e uses this expression to refer to
an object and the recipient interprets this or another expression-token e′
of the same type as another object, then there exists a misunderstanding
between the sender and the recipient in the act of communication by means
of the expression e (see Diagrams 4a and 4b).
4.1.5. Miscommunication: Non-understanding
If the sender of the expression e uses e to refer to a referent but the recip-
ient is unable to interpret the expression e or an expression identiﬁable with
that expression, then there follows a non-understanding (see Diagrams 6a
and 6b). Thus, symbolically:
DEFINITION 4a). (non-understanding):
non-unde(s, r) iﬀ s, r ∈ User ∧ e ∈ S ∧
∧ ∃o ∈ Ont (use(s, e) = o ∧ ∀o′ ∈ Ont (¬int(r, e) = o′)).
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DEFINITION 4b). (non-understanding):
Non-unde(s, r) iﬀ s, r ∈ User ∧ ∃e ∈ S (e ∈ e ∧
∧ ∃e′ ∈ e ∃o ∈ Ont (use(s, e) = o ∧ ∀o′ ∈ Ont (¬int(r, e′) = o′)).
Diagram 6a Diagram 6b
4.2. Type-level
4.2.1. Communication by means of expression-types
Empirical communication by means of expression-tokens has to be dis-
tinguished in a given community of Users from communication by means of
wfe-types. On the type-level we expand the conceptual apparatus of the TLC
with new notions. The most important one is the notion of communication
by means of types. It is determined as a value of an operation communica-
tion C deﬁned on expression-types.
The operation communication C is a function deﬁned as follows:
DEFINITION 5 (operation communication):
C : S∗ → 2User×S×User
C(e) = {〈s, e, r〉 : s, r ∈ User ∧ e ∈ e ∧ 〈s, e, r〉 ∈ ACom}
for every wfe-type e of language L.
The value C(e) of the function C for the expression-type e is called
communication by means of the expression-type e. Communication C(e) by
means of the expression-type e is the relation User×S×User consisting of all
ordered triples, such that the ﬁrst element (the sender) uses a wfe-token of e
and the third component (the recipient) interprets a token of e in an act
of communication. So, communication C(e) by means of the expression-
type e is the set of all communication acts by means of expression-tokens
of the type e.
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It includes the set of all communication acts by means of only one
token of the type. Moreover, it follows from earlier corollaries that there
exists a wfe-type e such that communication C(e) by means of type e is
a nonempty set. Thus we arrive at:
COROLLARY 4 a) {〈s, e, r〉 : s, r ∈ User∧ e ∈ e ∧ 〈s, e, r〉 ∈ acom} ⊆ C(e),
b) ∃e ∈ S∗ (C(e) 6= ∅).
4.2.2. Using types and Interpreting types
Users that participate in acts of communication belonging to lan-
guage communication by means of an expression-type e are also Using the
expression-type e: senders Use this type while recipients Interpret it. The re-
lation Use of Using expression-types and its sub-relation Int of Interpreting
expression-types are new notions of TLC. They are binary relations satisfy-
ing some axioms and deﬁned by means of relations use and int for tokens,
respectively:
AXIOM (Use): Use ⊆ User× S∗,
AXIOM (domain of Int): Dom1(Int) ⊆ Dom1(int) ⊆ User = Dom1(use).
The relation Use is deﬁned as follows:
DEFINITION 6 (Using types):
u Use e iﬀ ∃e ∈ e ∃o ∈ Ont (use(u, e) = o).
According to this deﬁnition, the user u Uses the wfe-type e iﬀ the user u
uses a wfe-token of the type e to refer to some referent.
The deﬁnition of relation Int is dual to the deﬁnition of the relation Use,
DEFINITION 6i (Interpreting types):
u Int e iﬀ ∃e ∈ e ∃o ∈ Ont (int(u, e) = o).
and it says that the user u Interprets the wfe-type e iﬀ the user u interprets
a wfe-token of the type e as some interpretandum.
Because int ⊆ use, i.e. the relation int of interpreting tokens is included
in the relation use of using tokens, the relation Int of interpreting types is
included in the relation Use of using types (see Corollary 5a); however, from
the Axiom given above for the relation Int for types, it follows that the user
who Uses a type does not need to be the one who Interprets it.
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Because communication C(e) by means of the type e is a nonempty set,
the above deﬁnitions lead to Corollary 5b) and the comment found at the
top of this subsection is justiﬁed:
COROLLARY: 5 a) Int ⊆ Use.
b) int = use⇒ Int = Use.
c) 〈s, e, r〉 ∈ C(e)⇒ s Use e ∧ r Int e.
d) Use 6= ∅, Int 6= ∅,
Point d) of the above corollary immediately follows from point c).
4.2.3. Problem of Adequacy of Language Communication
Adequate, eﬀective, successful communication in a community of Users
by means of the expression-type e is based on the agreed meaning µ(e) of
the expression-type e used by users who are senders of tokens of e in acts
of communication, and based on the correlation µ(e) with the interpreta-
tion ι(e) of the expression-type e interpreted by users who are recipients
of these tokens in the acts (cf. Wybraniec-Skardowska 2015). Compatibil-
ity of the meaning and the interpretation of the expression-type e leads
to understanding between senders and recipients (see Diagram 7).
Diagram 7
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A disagreement between the meaning and the interpretation of the
expression-type leads to misunderstanding, while ignorance of the interpre-
tation of the expression-type leads to non-understanding.
4.2.4. Notions Relating to Language Communication
It is obvious that the conceptual apparatus of the theory TLC has to
be enriched by notions concerning meaning and interpretation of language
expression-types.
As we said before, these notions will be characterized in relation to
the understanding of meaning as a manner of Using (usage) expression-
types and interpretation as a manner of Interpreting (Int) these expressions;
these manners are in a way built into this meaning and this interpretation,
respectively.
Interpretation indicates the meaning or meanings of a given expression-
type and cannot be identiﬁed with its meaning. Let us also note that the
notion of interpretation does not need to be connected with sign-based sys-
tems of communication only; in semantics, it plays a special, central role.
The notion of meaning is deﬁned by means of the relation ∼= of having
the same manner of Using wfe-types and the notion of interpretation – by
means of the relation ∼=i. of having the same manner of Interpreting (un-
derstanding) wfe-types (see Wybraniec-Skardowska, 2007a, b; 2015, 2016).
The deﬁnitions of these relations are as follows:
DEFINITION 7 (having the same manner of Using types):
e ∼= e′ iﬀ ∀u ∈ User [(u Use e⇔ u Use e′) ∧
∧ ∀o ∈ Ont (∃e ∈ e (use(u, e) = o)⇔ ∃e′ ∈ e′ (use(u, e′) = o))].
DEFINITION 7i (having the same manner of Interpreting types):
e ∼=i e
′ iﬀ ∀u ∈ User [u Int e⇔ u Int e′ ∧
∧ ∀o ∈ Ont (∃e ∈ e (int(u, e) = o)⇔ ∃e′ ∈ e′ (int(u, e′) = o))].
Two wfe-types e and e′ have the same manner of Using (resp. of Inter-
preting) wfe-types if and only if every user of language L uses (resp. inter-
prets) the other one every time he/she uses (resp. interprets) either of them,
and every object is a referent (resp. an interpretant) of some token of the
type e (used/interpreted by the user) iﬀ it is a referent (resp. an interpretant)
of some token of the other type e′ (used/interpreted by the user).
The relation ∼=i having the same manner of Interpreting types is given
if its arguments belong to Dom2(Int). So, we adopt the following axiom:
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AXIOM (domain of ∼=i): ∼=i ⊆ (Dom2(Int)×Dom2(Int)) ∩ ∼=.
And, the relation ∼=i is a sub-relation of the relation ∼=, and it can easily
be proved that it is a nonempty relation (from Corollary 5c: Int 6= ∅, and
because it is a reﬂexive relation).
THEOREM 1: The relations ∼= and ∼=i are equivalence relations in the
set S∗.
Deﬁnitions of meaning and interpretation of the wfe-type e are the following:
DEFINITIONS 8 (meaning and interpretation):
a) µ(e) = [e]∼= and b) ι(e) = [e]∼=i .
The deﬁnition of interpretation ι(e) of the wfe-type e is dual to the def-
inition of meaning µ(e) of the expression. According to these deﬁnitions:
Meaning µ(e) and interpretation ι(e) of the wfe-type e is the equivalence
class of all expressions possessing the same manner of Using or, respectively,
Interpreting (understanding), as the expression e, and can be intuitively un-
derstood as a common property of all wfe-types having the same manner of
Using or, respectively, Interpreting as the expression-type e. The property
can be called the manner of using or, respectively, the manner of inter-
preting of the expression-type e. In this way, we are referring here to ideas
originating from Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz
(1931, 1934), that is to understanding of the meaning as a manner of its
Use/Interpreting.
It is easy to see that we have:
THEOREM 2 a) ι(e) ⊆ µ(e).
b) int = use⇒ ι(e) = µ(e).
So, the notion of meaning is stronger than the notion of interpretation.
4.2.5. Dual Conceptual Counterparts
It should be observed that the notions of the system:
(*) use,Use,∼=, µ,
have, within TLC, dual counterparts in the system:
(**) int, Int,∼=i, ι.
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All the notions of the system (marked with two asterisks) have dual def-
initions towards the corresponding deﬁnitions of the theory TLC concerning
the notions of the ﬁrst system (*).
So, all theorems of the theory TLC formulated for the notions of (*) re-
main valid if we replace the notions of this system (*) with their dual coun-
terparts of (**). The close relationships between the semantic-pragmatic
notions of the systems (*) and (**) cause these notions to be often regarded
as identical. However, each relation or function of the system (**) is only
a sub-relation of its counterpart in the system (*) and not of all theorems
of TLC concerning the notions of this system which have their dual coun-
terparts.
The meaning µ(e) of a wfe-type e and the interpretation ι(e) of
the type e may diﬀer. If that is the case, the communication C(e) by means
of the wfe-type e does not have to be adequate.
Using the notions ofmeaning and interpretation we can deﬁne the notion
of adequacy of language communication.
4.2.6. Adequacy of Language Communication
As it has already been mentioned, in language communication, inter-
pretation indicates the meaning or meanings of the expression-type which
intermediates in this communication. An expression-type may have more
than one meaning. If it has more meanings, they are determined by sub-
types of the expression, as for example, for the terms: ‘key’ or ‘bank’.
We will adopt the following deﬁnition of adequacy of communication:
DEFINITION 9 (adequacy of language communication):
If e has n (n ≥ 1) meanings determined by its subtypes e
1
, e
2
, . . . , en
then C(e) is an adequate communication iﬀ
∀k = 1, . . . , n (ek has determined interpretation and ι(ek) = µ(ek)).
From the deﬁnition of adequacy of communication by means of wfe-type
we obtain some conditions of adequacy of language communication:
COROLLARY 6:
a) If e has n (n ≥ 1) meanings determined by its subtypes e1, e2, . . . , en,
then C(e) is not an adequate language communication iﬀ ∃k =
1, . . . , n (ek does not have a determined interpretation or ι(ek) 6= µ(ek)).
b) If e has an established meaning and e has a determined interpretation
then C(e) is an adequate language communication iﬀ ι(e) = µ(e).
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c) If e has an established meaning and e does not have a determined in-
terpretation, then C(e) is not an adequate language communication.
d) If e has an established meaning, e has a determined interpretation and
ι(e) 6= µ(e)), then C(e) is not an adequate language communication.
We see that the accord of meaning and interpretation is a necessary
condition of adequate language communication by means of expression-type
of L.
The two next theorems provide us with some suﬃcient conditions for
adequacy of communication by means of types.
THEOREM 3: If int = use and e has an established meaning and a deter-
mined interpretation then C(e) is an adequate language communication.
The above theorem follows from Theorem 2b and Corollary 6b.
5. Summary
The main objective of the work presented was to provide a conceptual
apparatus of a general logical theory of language communication. The out-
lined axiomatic theory explicates the key notions of contemporary syntax,
semantics and pragmatics.
The theory is formalized on two levels: token-level and type-level.
As such, it takes into account the dual – token and type – ontological char-
acter of linguistic entities.
The basic notions of the theory: language communication, meaning and
interpretation are introduced on the second, type-level of formalization, and
they require prior formalization of some of the notions introduced on the
ﬁrst, token-level; among others, the notion of an act of communication.
Owing to the theory, it is possible to address the problems of adequacy
of both empirical acts of communication and of language communication in
general.
However, so far it has not been possible to theoretically capture the
intuitive relationships between the adequacy of language communication
and the correctness of its communication acts.
The paper is only an attempt at providing a conceptual apparatus for
the theory. One cannot expect it to oﬀer strong theorems as yet, although
it seems that the theorems concerning the relationships between adequacy
of language communication and adequacy of its communication acts should
function well enough.
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All the general conditions of adequacy of language communication dis-
cussed in the presented paper were shown as if they were valid for one-way
communication (sender–recipient); nevertheless, they can also apply to the
reverse direction of language communication (recipient–sender). Therefore,
they concern the problem of two-way understanding in language communi-
cation.
Finally, it can be noted that the conceptual apparatus of the theory can
be enriched through the introduction of notions concerning some speciﬁc
forms of communication, such as discourse and dialog.
N O T E
* The sketch of the paper was presented by me and Jacek Waldmajer at IASS-AIS
9th World Congress of Semiotics, Communication : Understanding, Misunderstanding,
11–17 June 2007, Helsinki–Imatra, Finland. Some assumptions of this paper was also
presented by the author and Jacek Waldmajer at the 37th Poznań Linguistic Meeting,
20–23 April 2006; see also my and Jacek Waldmajer paper (2008). The present version of
the paper was delivered by me at Formal Methods and Science in Philosophy Conference,
4–6 May 2017, Dubrovnik, Croatia.
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